UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-3-2008

State v. Stone Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34571

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Stone Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34571" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1677.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1677

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

District Judge

EVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Lawrence Wasden
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
Stephen A. Bywater
-.. '.-.Lnmtnai
. Law -.
.,
Lnler,
ulvlsio~i
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400
Attorneys for Respondent
, v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii. .
11. Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . .
A. Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. .
B. Procedural and Factual History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I .
111. Issues Presented for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
.

A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in applying the incorrect legal standard to
the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas?
B. Did the District Court err in finding that Mr. Stone's guilty pleas were knowing and
voluntary given that they were entered without knowledge of the defenses being waived?
C. Did the District Court err in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea given that
Mr. Stone had demonstrated just cause to grant the motion, his motivation for the motion was not
simply to avoid a negative presentence report but rather to withdraw pleas entered in ignorance of
several potential viable defenses, and there was no allegation that the State would be prejudiced
by the withdrawal?
D. Did the District Court err in imposing an excessive sentence?
IV. Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
...
A. The District Court Erred in Applying the Incorrect Standard in Deciding the
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Pleas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

B. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Guilty Pleas Were Knowing and
Voluntary Given the Pleas Were Entered Without Knowledge of the Defenses Being
Waived . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1,..1.
C. The District Court Erred in Denying the Motion to Withdraw the Pleas as the
Motion met the Just Cause Standard Even Talting into Account the Motivation for
theMotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
.
D. The District Court Erred in lmposillg an Excessive Sentence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2 3

.

I TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Jones v. State. 118 Idaho 842. 801 P.2d 49 (Ct. App . 1990) ..................................................... 15
I

I

State v . Arthur. 145 Idaho 219. 177 P.3d 966 (2008) ...................................................

16. 21

Statev. Ballard. 114Idaho 799. 761 P.2d 1151 (1988) ........................
.
.
.
............15. 16. 21. 22
State v. Bello. 135 Idaho 442. 19 P.3d 66 (Ct. App . 2001) ....................................................... 25

........ 23

State v . Brown. 121 Idaho 385. 825 P.2d 482 (1992)
State v. Carrasco. 117 Idaho 295. 787 P.2d 281 (1990)

18

State v. Colyeu. 98 Idaho 32. 557 P.2d 626 (1976)
State v. Dopp. 124 Idaho 512. 861 P.2d 82 (Ct. App . 1992)
State v. Eubank. 114 Idaho 635. 759 P.2d 926 (Ct. App . 1988) ........................
.
..................
State v. Hanslovan. - Idaho

-.

- P.3d - 2008

WL 25 12529 (Ct. App . 2008) .....................16

State v. Hedger. 115 Idaho 598. 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ...........................................................
State v. Henderson. 113 Idaho 41 1. 744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App . 1987) ...................................

.

25

16
15. 16

-.

P.3d
2008 WL. 802823 (Ct. App . 2008) review
State v. Izaguirre. -Idaho
denied (2008) .................................................................................................................
23
State v. Johnson. 120 Idaho 408. 816 P.2d 364 (Ct. App . 1991) .......................
.
......... 21. 22. 23
State v. Li. 131 Idaho 126. 952 P.2d 1262 (Ct. App.1998)

........ 25

State v. Litz. 122 Idaho 387. 834 P.2d 904 (Ct. App . 1992)
State v. Lusby. -Idaho

.

P.3d

-.

15

2008 WL. 2278074 (Ct. App . 2008) ..................19

State v. Peterson. 98 Idaho 706. 571 P.2d 767 (1977) ................................................................18
State v. Wilkerson. 114 Idaho 174. 755 P.2d 471 (Ct . App . 1988)

19

State v. Young. 119 Idaho 510. 808 P.2d 429 (Ct. App . 1991) ...............................................

23

FEDERAL STATUTES

U.S. CONST., 5th. 6th. and 14th Amend .................................................................................. 9
STATE STATUTES

LC . 5 18-907

1

I.C. 5 18-915 ....................
.
......
.
.....................................................................................
1. 18
I.C. § 18-3316

1

LC . § 19-201 .............................
.
.
.
..........................................................................................
19
1.C. 5 27-2732 ............................ ....

IDAHO CONST.. Art.13

.....................

1
9

11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is a consolidated appeal from a criminal conviction and post-conviction proceedings.
Clerk's Record (CR) Vol. IV 732.
B. Procedural and Factual History
Appellant Faron Stone was charged by information with two counts of aggravated battery
upoil a law enforcement officer, I.C. 55 18-903, 18-907(1)(a) and 18-915, one count of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, I.C. 5 27-2732( c)(l), and one count of
unlawful possessioil of a firearm, LC. 5 18-3316. CR Vol. 11338. Part I1 of the information
alleged use of a firearm in commission ofthe offense. CR Vol. 11 341. And, Part III of the
information alleged that Mr. Stone was a persistent violator. CR Vol. 11 342.
The charges arose out of an attempt by the Chubbuck Police to serve a no-knock
daylnight warrant at approximately 1:42 am on March 7, 2005, on a single-wide trailer occupied
by Mr. Stone, his companion Maria Villa, and Ms. Villa's two children, a son, age 3 years, and a
daughter, age 8 months. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, Exhibit on Appeal,
p. I, 35, CR Vol. I1 208.
Maria Villa told the Idaho State Police that she and her children lived with Mr. Stone in
the trailer. She and Mr. Stone used methamphetamine together. About a month and a half prior
to the service of the search warrant, she got into a fight with Jose Gonzales and Jose told her that
he was going to shoot her in front of her children. She had seen him with a 91nm handgun in the
past and was afraid for her safety. CR Vol. 11231.

I

A couple of weeks after the fight, she bought two handguns to protect herself. About that

same time, family members told her that the police were watching her home. CR Vol. I1 23 1.
On May 7, 2006, about 1:30 am, Ms. Villa and Mr. Stone retuined home and placed the
children in bed. A short time later they heard voices outside and Mr. Stone left the bedroom to
see who was outside. As Mr. Stone left the bedroom, Ms. Villa heard a loud explosion inside the
trailer. Mr. Stone came running back into the bedroom and grabbed one of the guns from the
dresser. At no time did Ms. Villa hear anyone say that they were with the police or that a search
warrant was being served. CR Vol. II23 1.
Ijarley Merica was on the Chubbuck Police team as a breacher and team entry member.
According to his interview with the Idaho State Police, upon the command of Sergeant Frasure to
initiate the search, he fired two TKO door-breaching rounds from his Remiilgton 870 shotgun at
the front door of the trailer "disabling the locking mechanism." He then stepped out of the way,
and Officer Gilbert placed a "noise flash diversion device" inside the door.' CR Vol. 1 198.
Martin Frasure, the Special Team leader, told the Idaho State Police interviewer that he
heard Officer Galloway announce their presence over a PA, at which time Officer May placed a
flash noise diversionary device in the backyard of the trailer. Officer Merica then shot two doorbreachiilg rounds into the front door and Officer Gilbert placed another flash noise diversionary
device inside the front door. Then, gunfire erupted. CR Vol. I1 216.
Paul Gilbert, a patrol officer with the Chubbuck Police Department, told the Idaho State
Police that he participated in serving the search warrant while armed with a Glock .40 caliber

'

At the preliminary hearing, Martin Frasure, the Special Team leader, testified that a
noise flash diversion device causes a loud bang with an extremely bright white flash. The intent
is to disorient a person long enough for the police to get a time and surprise advantage over him.
Tr. Preliminary Ilearing p. 19.

handgun. He heard Officer Galloway announce "Chubbuck Police" over the PA and saw Officer
Merica fire two door-breaching rounds at the trailer. He also saw Officer Merica place a flash
noise device inside the trailer. Officer Gilbert entered the trailer and saw a revolver pointing
toward the front door and firing. He fired his Glock four to five times, reloaded, and left. CR
Vol. II220.
Officer Adam Anderson of the Chubbuck Police told the Idaho State Police that he also
assisted in serving the search warrant. According to him, he saw Officer Ballard go onto the
back step of the trailer and prepare to breach the door. He then saw a curtain inside the trailer
move as if someone had walked by it. Sergeant Frasure gave the signal to go and Officer May
deployed a noise flash diversionary device at the same time as Officer Galloway announced
"Chubbuck Police" over the PA. He and Officer Ballard began breaching the back door as he
heard Officer Merica breach the front door. He thought he heard two officers at the front door
announce "police warrant service." Then he heard gunshots being fired and he thought Officer
Ballard might have been hit. He sought cover below the skirting of the trailer. CR Vol. 11224225.
Officer Phillip Hill told the Idaho State Police that he was an entry team member on the
Special Response Teain. He did not tell the ISP that he ever heard the police announce
themselves. He pushed his way through the door to the trailer and once inside he was shot three
times in the buttock and lower back. He immediately turned and went back toward the front
porch where he fired three to four rounds from his submachine gun toward the threat in the
trailer. CR Vol. I1 228.
Dana May, a Chubbuck patrol officer, was assigned to carry a fire extinguisher and a

noise flash diversionary device to be deployed at the back ofthe trailer. He heard Sergeant
Frasure say "go" o'n the radio and he threw the noise flash device at the back of the trailer. He
heard Officer Galloway aimounce their presence on the bullhorn and heard another bang up front.
Then, he heard what he believed were seven shots being fired. He did not hear any officers in the
front ofthe trailer announce their presence. CR Vol. I1 237.
Officer Mike Ballard of the Chubbuck Police Department told the Idaho State Police that
he was to breach and hold the back door of the trailer along with Officer Anderson. They had a
ram and a halogen tool. As soon as Sergeant Frasure gave the go signal, Officer May threw the
noise flash diversionary device. Then Officer Ballard tried unsuccessfully to breach the back
door. While he was doing that, he could hear Officer Galloway on the bullhorn announcing their
presence and the search warrant. Having failed to breach the door, Officer Ballard broke a
window. As soon as he did that he felt something hit him and knock him back. He could hear
officers inside saying "police warrant service" or something to that effect. He heard a lot of
gunfire and a hole appeared in the side of the trailer. He stepped off the steps and could hear
bullets coining through the wall and door area. He had someone check him and it was reported
that he had beell shot in the shoulder. He went to where an ambulance was staged and was taken
to a medical center. He had been hit in the upper chest area. CR Vol. I1 240-241.
When Ms. Villa heard gunshots being fired, she fell to the floor by the bed. After several
shots were fired, all shooting stopped and Mr. Stone came back into the bedroom. She jumped
up to check on the children. Mr. Stone went to look outside to see if he could see who had been
around the trailer. When Mr. Stone came back into the bedroom, he said he believed the people
in the trailer had been the police because they had left their equipment behind. She and Mr.

Stone then grabbed the children and the guns a i d fled the area. No one tried to stop them. CR
Vol. 11232.
They drove around for a bit and stayed with various people. She left the children with
one friend. Finally, they realized that the police were near to where they were staying and they
peacefully surrendered. CR Vol. 11232-233.
Many neighbors in the trailer park were interviewed by police. Lori-Crowder Heath, who
hved two spaces east of Mr. Stone stated that she was awakened by the sound of a loud blast
followed by gunfire. She did not hear any announcement from the police or shouting prior to the
blast. CR Vol. I1 21 1.
Arlene Mitani was awalte sitting in the front room of her trailer across the street and to
I

the north of Mr. Stone's home. She heard a gunshot followed by someone either yelling
"Chuhbuck Police" or "Call the police." She did not report any yelling before the initial
shooting. After the yelling, she heard more shooting. CR Vol. II 21 1-212.
Sheila Frasure was asleep in her trailer across the street and to the southwest of Mr.
Stone's home. She was awakened by the sound of gunfire, but she did not hear any yelling prior
to the shooting. CR Vol. II 212.
Brian Price was awake in his trailer across the street and to the west of Mr. Stone's home.
He heard yelling and then gunfire, but he could not tell what words were being yelled. CR Vol.

11213.
Counsel was appointed and several motions filed, including a suppression motion. CR
Vol. I1 353-423, Vol. 111426-474. The suppression motion alleged that the daylnight no-knock
warrant was based upon false information andor upon reckless disregard for the truth. In

particular: 1) the affidavit supporting the warrant overstated, exaggerated, or was so vague as to
be misleading with regard to the affiant's qualifications and experience; 2) the information
supporting the affidavit came from a person who wanted Mr. Stone evicted from the trailer and
was supplied on March 7,8, and 15, of 2005, and the search did not take place until May 7,2005,
thus it was both unreliable and stale; 3) the affiant failed to state that children lived in the trailer,
even though he knew this to be the case;' 4) the garbage was searched on May 3,2005, hut the
search did not take place until May 7,2005; and 5) none of the information in the affidavit was
from the direct ltnowledge of the affiant and was based upon insinuations and exaggerations. CR
Vol. I11 432.
However, the case was ultimately resolved by a plea agreement. Mr. Stone pled guilty to
one count of aggravated battery upon a police officer and one count of unlawful possession of a
firearm. The remaining charges and Parts I1 and 111of the information were dismissed.
Additionally, it was agreed that the State would recommend a unified sentence of 15 years with
7.5 years fixed and would not initiate any affirmative action with regard to any charges being
brought by the federal govenment. The plea agreement was not binding on the District Court.
CR Vol. 111484,487.
Just two months later, prior to sentencing, Mr. Stone filed a p r o se motion to withdraw
his plea, stating that there was just cause to allow withdrawal as he was not allowed time to
consider the plea agreement, counsel did not explain the non-binding nature of the agreement,
and counsel engaged in overreaching to obtain his acquiescence in the plea agreement. CR Vol.

In fact, the police knew that children were in the trailer when they served the search
warrant because, according to Officer Ballard, they had seen the children going into the trailer
just before they breached the door. PSI p. 27.

II1490. In particular, Mr. Stone pointed out that he had understood that the State's sentencing
recommendation would be binding upon the Court, he did not understand that his plea could not
be revoked, he was given just 48 hours to consider the plea agreement, he felt extreme pressure
from his attorneys to accept the agreement, and his attorneys were not totally forthcoming with
all the information he needed to make an informed decision about entering a plea. CR Vol. III

Trial counsel then moved to withdraw based upon a conflict of interest in their continued
representation of Mr. Stone. CR Vol. III 497. The Court granted this motion, appointed new
counsel, and ordered that a transcript of the guilty plea hearing be prepared. CR Vol. I11 501.
New counsel then filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the following grounds:
1) ineffective assistance by prior counsel;
2) misrepresentations by prior counsel regarding evidence implicating Mr. Stone
in the charged
- offenses - specifically,
. counsel told Mr. Stone that the police had
recovered a gun purportedly used by him in the offense when in fact the gun had
not been recovered;

3) prior counsel failed to seek Mr. Stone's pre-trial release, which would have
allowed counsel's investigator to undertake an investigation which would prove
that the officers were not injured by bullets fired from the handgun allegedly used
by Mr. Stone;
4) prior counsel failed to pursue a defense based upon the fact that no slugs from
the gun allegedly used by Mr. Stone, nor the gun itself, were ever recovered,
making it impossible for the State to prove Mr. Stone's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt;

5) prior counsel failed to either tell Mr. Stone of these possible defenses or
investigate these possible defenses prior to entry of the guilty plea;

6) Mr. Stone did not learn of his potential defenses until after he had entered the
guilty plea;

7) there were discrepancies in the evidence about whether the police identified
themselves as police prior to entering Mr. Stone's home and firing their weapons,
and Mr. Stone did not know that the intruders were police at the time he shot in
self-defense, and this would be a defense to the criille of aggravated battery upon a
law enforcement officer;

8) prior counsel did not raise or explain this possible defense to Mr. Stone,
leading him to make a unknowing and involuntary plea;
9) evidence existed to establish that Mr. Stone thought that the person who was
firing into his home was Jose Speedy, a man Mr. Stone knew to be armed and
dangerous, however, prior counsel did not inform him that his belief that the
person he shot at was someone other than a police officer could be a defense to
the crime of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, leading him to make
a plea that was not knowing and voluntary;

10) prior counsel did not sufficiently and adequately investigate the issue of selfdefense, resulting in Mr. Stone entering a plea that was not knowing and
voluntary;
11) prior counsel failed to fully investigate evidence indicating that the codefendant fired the shots which hit the police officers;
12) Mr. Stone's plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was made without
counsel having investigated evidence that the officers were actually hit by the codefendant's shots rather than shots fired by Mr. Stone;
13) prior counsel failed to investigate the defense that Mr. Stone could not have
fired the shots which injured the police as the gun he allegedly used held only five
rounds, five rounds were fired into the wall, and there was not time for him to
have reloaded, and his guilty plea was not ltnowing and voluntary as it was
entered without investigation into this defense;

14) prior counsel failed to secure independent forensic testing of the handgun and
the rounds recovered:
15) prior counsel did not investigate the law, regulations, and protocol governing
the use of deadly weapons and other firearms when the police enter a home, thus
preventing Mr. Stone from raising potential defenses based upon the violation of
these laws and rules;
16) prior coullsel did not investigate,the law, regulations, and protocol governing
the use of deadly weapons and other firearms when entering homes where the

police have notice that infants and children are present, thus preventing Mr. Stone
froin raising potential defenses based upon the violation of those laws and rules;
17) prior couilsel failed to investigate the potential for collusion between the two
injured officers who were represented by the same attorney at their individual
interviews after the event;
18) prior counsel coerced and forced Mr. Stone to enter a guilty plea;
19) prior counsel misled Mr. Stone to believe that ifthe judge declined to follow
the State's sentencing recommendation, he would be allowed to withdraw his
plea;
20) Mr. Stone was not able to enter a voluntary and knowing plea because at the
time the plea was entered he was suffering from psychological instability as a
result of having been placed in lock-down and segregation at the Bannock County
Jail: and
21) prior counsel never explored a defense based upon the fact that Mr. Stone was
never identified at the scene of the shooting.

Based upon these reasons and the 5"', 6Ih,and 14" Amendments, and Article 13 of the Idaho
I
I

Constitution, Mr. Stone asked that the District Court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. CR
Vol. 111 513.
The District Court heard and denied the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea just prior
to sentencing. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 17. In its oral comments, the Court focused on the fact that Mr.
Stone had been thoroughly questioned at the plea hearing and had been clear that he wanted to
enter the plea. For example, the Court stated:
I was talking lo him about every bit of this kind of stuff. Every last bit of it.
Asking him if he had any problems with his attorney. Asking him if he had any
problem with what he understood the evidence to be. Asking him every one of
these questions. Telling him I don't want you to plead. I'd rather you go to trial.
Please don't plead. He every time said, no. I know exactly where I anl, know
exactly what I'm doing, know exactly what the situation is.
Tr. 10/19106 p. 22.

With regard to the standard of review, the following transpired:
Court: What's the standard of review?
Mr. Reynolds [defense counsel]: I would believe it would probably be deference
to the Court's taking of the plea. I think that probably would be based on the fact
that the Court was present to observe the defendant's demeanor, his responses, to
inquire of counsel, to perceive counsel's demeanor, the State's representative, its
demeanor, to take and make an assessment based on the information presented at
that time.
Court: And determine whether someone, based on all the facts, all the situation as
it existed at the point, made a knowing and voluntary plea.
Mr. Reynolds: I understand, your I-Ionor.
Court: Asking the defendant all of the questions necessary to make sure about that
and making sure that that's where the defendant was.
Mr. Reynolds: I understand, your Honor.
Tr. 10119106 p. 23
Later, the Court made further comments about the standard of review:
Court: And frankly, I think this procedure is a lot more like a plea after sentence
than it is a plea before. Because this defendant did not come into this courtroom
not knowing a thing about what I was going to do. He tried to get me to bind
myself to 7 and a half and 7 and a half and I said no, I'm not doing it. And then
he tries after knowing that, he enters his plea and then he tries to withdraw his
plea.
So I think this is a little bit different even than the regular plea. And I think the
standard of review even gets different. And I think this defendant and this record
has to be - has to be right on with what happened and that's why his plea was
taken like this.
Tr. 10119106 p. 26-27.
Defense counsel then pointed out that there was an error in informing Mr. Stone of the
maximum penalty possible. While he was told by the Court and counsel that the maximum

penitentiary term possible was 25 years, in fact, it is 30 years. The Court suggested that it could
remedy this by not sentencing Mr. Stone to over 25 years. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 28.
The State argued in response that Mr. Stone's pleas were lmowing and voluntary. The
State made no reference to the question of whether just cause would support withdrawal of the
plea, nor whether it would be prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea. Tr. 10119/06 p. 31-32.
Following this, the Court determined that the plea was voluntary and knowing and denied
the motion. In its comments, the Court never mentioned the just cause standard, an analysis of
Mr. Stone's motivation for attempting to withdraw the pleas, nor what, if any, prejudice
withdrawal might mean for the State. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 34. In its written order on the motion, the
Court stated only: "After argument, the Court DENIED the Motion and proceeded to
sentencing." CR Vol. UI 523.
Officer Ballard and Officer Hill both testified in the sentencing portion of the
proceedings. Both asked for heavy sentences. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 42-47. The State and the defense
both asked for a term of 15 years with 7.5 fixed. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 45,47.
Mr. Stone had a prior record which began with juvenile matters. The most significant
priors included an aggravated battery and attempted robbery which resulted in a 15-year Idaho
sentence imposed in 1984 and a kidnaping which resulted in a 10.5 year Arizona sentence
imposed in 1995. PSI p. 8-9. While in prison, Mr. Stone had many DORs. PSI p. 23.
Additionally, Mr. Stone absconded from parole in 1993. However, he turned himself into
Binghanl County in 2004, and was returned to prison. Within just six months, after it was
established that Mr. Stone had been in no trouble since 1993, he was placed on parole and
discharged that same day. Mr. Stone was placed on parole in Arizona in 2004. When he failed

to report for supervision, a warrant was issued and he served time on the Arizona charge while in
the Bingham jail awaiting sentencing in this case. PSI p. 11-15.
Mr. Stone is Native American and grew up mostly in the Fort Iiall area. His family was
poor and his father was alcoholic and sniffed paint. His parents divorced when he was very
young and for a time he and his siblings lived with grandparents. Mr. Stone was in special
education and ultimately unable to complete high school. An evaluatioil done in Arizona states
that Mr. Stone is limited by low intelligence (IQ 85), functioning in some areas in the mentally
retarded range. PSI p. 16, 19,38, 39.
When he returned to Idaho in 2004, Mr. Stone paid the Native American Consulting
Services and Management Company to help him get his life in order. He began selfemployment, buying and remodeling trailer homes. PSI p. 19.
Also, while in prison, Mr. Stone worked with a psychologist and made progress in
understanding his anger and the reasons for it and began efforts to gain rational control over it.
PSI p. 20.
Mr. Stone started drinking regularly at age 13 and, according to a prior PSI, is only sober
while incarcerated. However, he did undergo alcoholism treatment at Orofino and was given a
guarded prognosis. He also has used a variety of other drugs. However, when he was paroled in
Idaho, he entered the Fort Hall Treatment program and did well until he left the program without
permission. PSI p. 21.
The defense argued in favor of the 15-year sentence with 7.5 fixed because such a term
would provide time for Mr. Stone to participate in rehabilitative programs in prison and give him
a chance to change his life. Tr. 10119/06 p. 48. The defense also pointed out that under the

totality of the circumstances, Mr. Stone had reason to believe he and the others in the trailer were
being shot at, had reason to fear a man named Jose who had threatened such action, and was
acting to protect himself and the others. Additionally, there was some evidence that the officers
had actually shot each other rather than being shot by Mr. Stone. Tr. 10119106 p. 49-52.
Additionally, as the defense pointed out, when Mr. Stone was released from prison and
returned to Idaho, he undertook self-employment and engaged in positive activities for the
community, buying rundown trailers and fixing thein up. Tr. 10119106 p. 52-53.
Mr. Stone was disadvantaged by his childhood when he learned violent behavior from his
father. Despite this bad beginning, he did, according to counsel, compete his GED in prison and
had begun looking into Christianity as a means of help in turning his life around. Moreover, he
had developed goals for his life, including becoming a mentor to young people to warn them off
of the path he took. To that end, he had entered on his own, using his own funds, rehabilitation
programs when he was released from prison. Tr. 10/19106 p. 54-56.
The Court, citing protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment
imposed a sentence of five years fixed on the firearm charge followed by 25 years with 20 fixed
on the battexy charge. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 71-76.
A notice of appeal was subsequently filed. CR Vol. III 528.
Mr. Stone then filed a p r o se Criminal Rule 35 motion, seeking both correction of an
illegal sentence and reduction of his sentence. CR Vol. IV 553. This was followed shortly
thereafter by apvo se petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel had been
ineffective in not filing a timely notice of appeal and that his appeal had therefore been dismissed
without review on the merits. CR Vol. IV 678.

In response, trial counsel's motion to withdraw was granted and new counsel appointed.
CR Vol. I V 690. New counsel represented Mr. Stone in a hearing on his Rule 35 motion.
Counsel stated that while Mr. Stone's motion appeared to he seeking a new sentencing hearing,
counsel did not believe that could he achieved through the Rule 35 and instead asked the Court to
consider new material Mr. Stone offered as a basis for leniency and a reduction in the sentence.
The Court concurred that the Rule 35 was not a proper vehicle to obtain a new sentencing
hearing and then denied the motion without further explanation other tl~ansaying that the
sentence was appropriate. Tr. 6/18/07 p. 78-81, CR Vol. IV 694.
About a month later, a hearing was held on the post-conviction petition. At the close of
that hearing, the Court granted relief allowing Mr. Stone to refile his appeal. CR Vol. N 697.
Mr. Stone refiled the notice of appeal raising the issues of whether the District Court
erred in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and whether the sentence was excessive
CR Vol. I V 697,699, 733.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in applying the incorrect legal standard to
the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas?

B. Did the District Court err in finding that Mr. Stone's guilty pleas were knowing and
voluntary given that they were entered without lalowledge of the defenses being waived?
C. Did the District Court err in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea given that
Mr. Stone had demonstrated just cause to grant the motion, his motivation for the motion was not
simply to avoid a negative presentence report but rather to withdraw pleas entered in ignorance of
several potential viabledefenses, and there was no allegation that the State would be prejudiced

by the withdrawal?
D. Did the District Courl e n in imposing an excessive sentence?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Erred in Applying the Incorrect Standard in Deciding the
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Pleas.

h deciding the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, the District Court considered only
whether Mr. Stone's pleas were knowing and voluntary. The Court did not consider whether
there was just cause to support withdrawal of the pleas, whether Mr. Stone's motivation for
moving to withdraw the pleas militated for or against granting the motion, nor whether the State
would be prejudiced if the motion was granted. In failing to consider just cause, Mr. Stone's
motivation, and the lack of prejudice to the State, the District Court abused its discretion
Denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Litz, 122 Idaho 387,388,834 P.2d 904,905 (Ct. App. 1992). When a defendant seeks to

withdraw a guilty plea, the first question is whether the plea was constitutionally valid. If not,
withdrawal should be granted. If the plea was constitutionally valid, the second question is
whether withdrawal should nevertheless be allowed as a matter of discretion. State v. Dopp, 124
Idaho 512, 516, 861 P.2d 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. State, 118 Idaho 842, 844, 801 P.2d
49,5 1 (Ct. App. 1990). If a defendant establishes a just cause for withdrawal of the plea, the
motion should be granted uilless the State demonstrates that prejudice would result. State v,
Ballavd, 114 Idaho 799, 802, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1988), citing State v. Hendevson, 113 Idaho
41 1, 744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987) ("In granting or denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentencing has occurred, the district court is empowered with broad discretion, liberal

exercise of which is encouraged." 113 Idaho at 414,744 P.2d at 798 (citations omitted).) A
motion made after sentencing may be granted only to correct a manifest injustice. ICR 33 (c);
State v. Ballavd, 114 Idaho 799, 801,761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1988). When a motion to withdraw a
plea is made before sentencing, but after the defendant has seen the PSI or received other
information about the probable sentence, the District Court may temper its liberality by weighing
the defendant's apparent motive. State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008).
In reviewing a District Court decision for an abuse of discretion, "the appellate court
coilducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Ifanslovan, Idaho -, -P.3d

-2008 WL 2512529 (Ct. App. 2008), citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,

600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
In this case, the District Court abused its discretion by failing to act "within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it." Id. In particular, the District Court considered only whether Mr. Stone's
pleas were constitutionally valid insofar as they were knowingly and voluntarily entered. As the
Court stated:
Court: What's the standard of review?
Mr. Reynolds [defense counsel]: I would believe it would probably be deference
to the Court's taking of the plea. I think that probably would be based on the fact
that the Court was present to observe the defendant's demeanor, his responses, to
inquire of counsel, to perceive counsel's demeanor, the State's representative, its
demeanor, to take and made an assessment based on the information presented at

Court: And determine whether someone, based on all the facts, all the situation as
it existed at the point, made a knowing and voluntary plea.
Mr. Reynolds: I understand, your Honor.
Court: Asking the defendant all of the questions necessary to make sure about that
and making sure that that's where the defendant was.
Tr. 10119/06 p. 23.
The District Court did not go on to determine whether either a just cause supported
withdrawal, whether Mr. Stone's motivation for withdrawal militated for or against granting the
motion, nor whether the State would suffer any prejudice if the motion was granted
Because the District Court did not apply the proper standard to the decision before it, the
order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must be reversed and the matter remanded.
B. The District Court Erred i~zFinding that the Guilty Pleas Were Knowing and
Voluntary Given the Pleas Were Entered Without Knowledge of the Defenses
Being Waived.
The order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must be reversed because the
District Court abused its discretion in not applying the correct legal standard. The order must also
be reversed because the District Court erred in finding the pleas were knowing and voluntary.
The first step in deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine whether the
plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. State v. Dopp, supra. In this case, the District Court
erred in finding that the pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily, given that the pleas were
entered based upon false and i~lcompleteinformation provided by defense counsel and without
knowledge of the potential defenses being waived thereby.
The determination that a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly involves a

three-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that
he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront
his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the
defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 98
Idaho 32, 34,557 P.2d 626,628 (1976). On appeal, voluntariness of the guilty plea
and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record as a whole. State v.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,300,787 P.2d 281,286 (1990) (citing State v. Peterson,
98 Idaho 706,571 P.2d 767 (1977)).

State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 515, 861 P.2d at 84.
New counsel's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas cited 21 bases for withdrawal of the
guilty pleas. Several of those go to demonstrate that the pleas were not knowing and voluntary
because in making the pleas, Mr. Stone did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to a
jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself. Id. The waiver was
not knowing and intelligent because Mr. Stone made the waiver without having been informed of
the potential defenses in the case.
In particular, the motion states that prior counsel did not fully investigate the possibility of
basing a defense upon the fact that Mr. Stone did not lrnow that the men deploying flash grenades
in his trailer and then entering with guns were police. Nor did coullsel infonn Mr. Stone of this
potential defense. As noted in the motion to withdraw, one of the elements of aggravated battery
upon a law enforcement officer is that the defendant either knows or has reason to know of the
victim's status. I.C. 3 18-915, CR Vol. 111 516.
According to the Law Enforcement and Corrections Techi~ologyCenter, the flash of light
from a flash bang grenade is like "looking directly into the sun" and the simultai~eousbang
reaches "a painful 170 decibels." "If you are the target, it would be pretty temfying. You
probably will think you are going to be incinerated," according to Greg MacAleese, president and

CEO of Law Enforcemnem~tTechnologies (LET). "The whole idea is to simultaneously attack most
of your senses" and disorient the target. National hstitute of Justice, TECHbeat, "A Big Bang and
Flash With LTL" Summer 2003. Accordingly, if Mr. Stone did not know and did not have reason
to know that the armed men setting off explosives in the trailer in the middle of the night in the
presence of a baby and a three-year-old were police, he could not be guilty of aggravated battery
upon a law enforcement officer.
Likewise, prior counsel did not fully investigate nor inform Mr. Stone of the possibility of
raising a claim of self-defense. There was evidence that Mr. Stone reasonably believed he was
under armed attack by Jose Speedy who had previously threatened to shoot and kill Mr. Stone's
companion, Maria Villa, in front of her children. Given that reasonable belief, Mr. Stone would
have been legally allowed to protect himself, Maria, and the children, as well as his home, from
armed intruders. LC. $5 19-201 et seq., CR Vol. 111 517.
Likewise, prior counsel did not investigate nor infonn Mr. Stone of potential defenses
based upon ballistics analyses. CR Vol. 111 5 18. Prior counsel also did not investigate nor inform
Mr. Stone of potential defenses based upon the fact that all the police officers involved in this
case were represented by a single attorney and that this created a potential for collusion among the
officers to establish Mr. Stone's guilt. CR Vol. III 519.
Prior counsel also failed to inform Mr. Stone of potential defenses based upon resistance
to illegal police action in obtaining and serving the warrant by improper means. See State v.
Wilkevson, 114 Idaho 174, 178, 755 P.2d 471,476 (Ct. App. 1988), noting the inodem trend

permitting forceful resistance to an arrest when excessive force is used by the officer. Contrast
this case with State v. Lusby -Idaho

,

P.3d -,

2008 WL 2278074 (Ct. App. 2008),

wherein the Court noted that "an individual may not use force to resist apeaceable arrest by one
she knows or has good reason to believe is a police officer, even if the arrest is illegal under the
circumstances." In this case, a peaceful arrest was not being conducted. Rather an entire team of
heavily armed officers were detonating explosive diversionary devices and carrying and using
deadly weapons inside a home occupied by an infant and a three-year-old. Further, there was a
serious question about whether the police announced their prescncc prior to setting off the
grenades (an unlikely event given that the police Search Warrant Application sought and received
a "no-knock service warrant for officer safety purposes") or if Mr. Stone could even have heard a
later announcement (if that occurred) given the aural assault to which he had just been subjected.
Because counsel did not investigate these potential defenses nor discuss them in any way
with Mr. Stone, he could not have knowingly and intelligently waived them. He could not have
entered a knowing and voluntary plea. The District Court's finding to the contrary was erroneous
and the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea must now be reversed
C . The District Court Erred in Denying the Motion to Withdraw the Pleas as the
Motion met the Just Cause Standard Even Taking into Account the Motivation
for the Motion.

As set out above, the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must he
reversed both because the District Court abused its discretion in applying the incorrect standard to
the motion and because the District Court erred in finding that the pleas were knowing and
voluntary. In addition, the District Court erred in denying the motion to withdraw the pleas
because the motion met the just cause standard, even taking into account Mr. Stone's motivation
for filing the motion.
As set out above, if a defendant establishes a just cause for withdrawal of a plea, the

motion should be granted unless the State demonstrates that prejudice would result. State v.
Ballard, suka. When a motion to withdraw a plea is made before sentencing, but after the

defendant has seen the PSI or received other information about the probable sentence, the District
Court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive. State v. Arthur,
supra. Nevertheless, when a just reason to withdraw the plea is presented, relief should be

granted absent a strong showing of prejudice by the State. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411,
816 P.2d 364,366 (Ct. App. 1991).

In this case, just cause was established to withdraw the plea. Just cause existed both
because Mr. Stone had not been properly informed by counsel of the potential defenses to the
charges and because Mr. Stone had not been properly advised regarding the maximuin penalty.

In these ways, this case is like State v. Johnson, supra. In Johnson, the State had failed to
provide exculpatory and material reports which could have been used to mount a defense to the
charge, and Johnson was wrongly advised of the maximum penalty. The Court of Appeals
determined that these circumstances amounted to just cause to withdraw the plea. Even when the
Court considered Johnson's motivation for withdrawal, as the motion to withdraw was not made
until after he had seen the presentence report, the Court found that the lower court should have
granted the motion to withdraw.

In this case, the potential exculpatory and material infonnatioii that could have been used
to raise a defense to the charges was not hidden from Mr. Stone by the State. Rather, it was
hidden from him by his attorneys' failure to investigate the potentially exculpatory material and to
inform Mr. Stone of the material's existence and significance. Just as in Johnson, Mr. Stone's
ignorance of the potential defenses he was waiving when he entered his pleas, along with the

misinformation about the penalties he was facing, constitutes a just cause for withdrawal of the
pleas.
And, just as in Johnson, the State did not offer any reasons why prejudice would result if
the motion to withdraw the plea was granted. And, while a finding of prejudice is not necessary
for rejection of a motion to withdraw a plea, the lack of prejudice weighs in favor of granting the
motion. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho at 370, 816 P.2d at 414, citing State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho at
801-02, 761 P:2d at 1153-54 n. 2 (1988).
And, last, the conclusion that the motion to withdraw the plea should have been granted
remains standing even when Mr. Stone's motivation for the motion is considered. As noted
above, because Mr. Stone's motion was made after the presentence report had been prepared, the
Court was allowed to consider the motivation for withdrawal. State v. Johnson, supra. Where the
motion is made simply to avoid the consequences of a negative presentence report, it might be that
a court could properly deny the motion. Id. But, in this case, as in Johnson, the motivation was
not avoidance of the presentence report. The Court had repeatedly told Mr. Stone prior to entry of
his plea that it was not going to be bound by the State's sentencing request. In the Court's own
description of Mr. Stone's state of knowledge at the time the plea was entered, "[Ilt's absolutely
clear to me he knew he could get 30 years. . . . Even though the State's going to recommend 7 and
a half and 7 and a half, I'm not bound to that. You know that. You could get 30. Yeah I know
that." Tr. 10119106 p. 24-25. Mr. Stone's motivation for withdrawal of his plea could not have
been the desire to avoid the consequences of the presentence report. He had been told by the
Court itself well before the plea was even entered that the Court intended to impose a severe
sentence much greater than the sentence recommended by the State.

Rather, the only obvious motivation for Mr. Stone's motion is his discovery that he had
defenses to the charges which had never been investigated nor explained to him. Just as the
Johnson Court found that, even considering the defendant's motivation, withdrawal should have
been allowed, in this case also, even considering Mr. Stone's motivation, withdrawal should have
been allowed.

In summary, just cause existed to support withdrawal of the pleas because Mr. Stone made
the pleas without having had his defenses explained or investigated. He was for all intents and
purposes in the same position as a defendant who has had exculpatory evidence withheld by the
State. Just as in Johnson where withdrawal was held proper, withdrawal is proper here.
Therefore, the District Court order denying the motion should now be reversed.
D. The District Court Erred in Imposiizg an Excessive Sentence.
As discussed above, the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas should be
reversed and the matter reinai~dedfor further proceedings. In the alternative, the order imposing
sentence should be reversed as the sentence was excessive.
On appeal, a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Izaguirre, -Idaho

-,

-P.3d

-,

2008 WL 802823,3 (Ct. App. 2008) review denied (2008); State v. Brown,

121 Idaho 385,393, 825 P.2d 482,490 (1992). A sentence is only reasonable insofar as it
satisfies the goals of protection of society, deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of the offender, and
retribution. Id In reviewing a sentence, the appellate court makes an independent review of the
record, focusing on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. Izaguirre,
supra, State v. Young, 119 Idaho 510, 51 1, 808 P.2d 429,230 (Ct. App. 1991).
Ln this case, the State recommended a total term of 15 years with 7.5 years fixed.

However, the District Court rejected this recommendation and imposed five years fixed on the
firearm charge, followed by 25 years on the aggravated battery with 20 of those years fixed. This
fixed term of 25 years exceeds the state's recommendation by 333%. And, given Mr. Stone's age
of 42 at the time of sentencing, this is a functional life sentence as he will not be eligible for
parole until he is 67 years old and he will not complete his sentence until age 72.
According to a recent study by faculty members of the Harvard University School of
Public Health, among others, a Native American Male bom in 1982 has a life expectancy of only
62 years. Murray CJL, Kulkami SC, Michaud C, Tomijima N, Bulzacchelli MT, et al. (2006),
Eight Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities across Races, Counties, and Race-Counties in
the United States, PLoS Med 3(9) (2006). (Mr. Stone was born in 1964, but the public health
study cited only looked at data from 1982 on.) Given this expectancy, Mr. Stone's parole
eligibility date will not arrive until some 5 years afier his death. (This is even assuming that life
in prison, with its attendant stresses, laclc of good nutrition, inadequate medical care and exposure
to life-shortening diseases, will not further reduce Mr. Stone's life expectancy.)
Because the fixed term exceeds Mr. Stone's expected life span, it is relevant to consider
the case law on fixed life terms:
Under these r~oohilP1standards, a fixed life sentence may be deemed reasonable if
the offense is so egregious that it demands an exceptionaliy severe measure of
retribution and deterrence, or if the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative uotential
that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting society.

[A] fixed life term, with its rigid preclusion of parole or good time, should be
regarded as a sentence requiring a high degree of certainty-certainlythat the nature
State v. Toohill, supra.
24

of the crime demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty
that the perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released.
State v. Eubanic, 114 Idaho 635,638, 759 P.2d 926,929 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Li,131 Idaho
126, 129,952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App.1998). The Eubankrule applies both to fixed-life
sentences and fixed-term sentences which cause the defendant to "effectively spend the rest of his
life in prison." State v. Bello, 135 Idaho 442,444, 19 P.3d 66,68 (Ct. App. 2001).
I11 this case, the sentence was not reasonable because the offense, given the totality of the
circumsta~~ces,
did not demand an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence and
because Mr. Stone is not so utterly lacking in rehabilitative potential so as to make imprisonment
until death the only feasible means of protecting society.
While Mr. Stone does have a significant prior record, there are at least two equally
significant factors which militate toward leniency.
First, Mr. Stone's life circumstances put him at a serious disadvantage. He was born into a
family that was marred by his father's alcoholis~nand paint sniffing, a family where he was taught
to be violent and a family that ultimately broke into pieces. He was not well-educated and he had
to struggle with the challenge of having a low IQ. He did not have the stability and safe
environment where he could have learned how to be a productive, healthy, law abiding person.
And, layered on top of this were his own drug and alcohol problems. Yet, he was attempting to
better himself. Mr. Stone had turned to tribal services to get his life in order. He had started his
own business rehabilitating trailers. He had attempted to get on the right track.
Second, the events that lead to the battery alleged in this case were created in large part by
the actions of the police department in moving in on the trailer in a violent manner at a time when

Mr. Stone did not know what was happening and was inside with small children and a woman
whom he believed was going to be the target of a shooting. This was not a situation where Mr.
Stone sought out someone to attack nor a situation wherein he was the initial aggressor. When
looking at the four goals of sentencing, it becomes evident that the sentence imposed was
unreasoilable. The sentence exceeded that needed for the protection of society. Mr. Stone was
turning his life around. It is not at all clear that he will not be safe for release prior to the end of
the 25 years he must now serve before he is parole eligible. The sentence also exceeded that
needed for purposes of deterrence. While the charged offenses were certaiilly very serious, there
were unique circun~stances.Given those unique circumstances, a 25 year fixed term is not
necessary to deter either Mr. Stone nor others from similar criminal activity. The sentence also
exceeded that needed for purposes of rehabilitation. Whatever programming is available to Mr.
Stone in prison for rehabilitative purposes will surely take less than 25 years to complete. And,
finally, the sentence exceeded that appropriate for retribution. Again, while the charged offenses
are certainly very serious, given the unique circumstances involved, a 25 year fixed term, followed
by another five years indeterminate, exceeds any amount that could fairly be said to serve the
purpose of retribution.
For these reasons, if the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas is not
reversed, the order imposing sentence should be reversed and the matter remanded for
resentencing.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Stone requests that the order denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas be reversed and the matter remanded for further appropriate

proceedings. In the alternative, Mr. Stone requests that the order imposing sentence be reversed
and the matter remanded for resentencing.
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